报告题目：Supply Chain Performance under Yield Ambiguity: Overconfident Price Competition
报告内容：We investigate how overconfidence bias would affect members—a supplier and two competing retailers—in a supply chain under yield ambiguity. We consider a setting where the distributional information of the random yield is limited and is only characterized by the support, mean, and variance. We study two types of overconfidence, named, respectively, overestimation that the decision-maker overestimates the mean of the random yield and overprecision that the decision-maker underestimates its variability. A Stackelberg game is played among the supplier and retailers with a price competition played between the two retailers. Using a distribution-free approach, we obtain closed-form equilibrium solutions of all six cases wherein the supplier and retailers could be overconfident. Comparative studies highlight the impacts of the two types of overconfidence: although these two overconfident behaviors have significantly different effects on the equilibrium, they both reduce double marginalization and can lead to the first-best outcome in the centralized, non-competing, and unbiased system.
报告人简介：邢国敏，暨南大学管理学院讲师，博士毕业于华南理工大学工商管理学院，期间曾赴香港城市大学访问学者。研究领域包括但不限于：鲁棒优化，库存管理，行为运营管理。目前，论文发表于《Production and Operations Management》及《南开管理评论》等国内外知名期刊。